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ABSTRACT: I use a simple two-period learning-by-doing model to examine optimal home
country protection policy. In some cases, the home government will impose an import ban
to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the other hand, very often, a
protective tariff provides greater welfare than when an import ban is imposed. In these
cases, the first period equilibrium tariff is greater than the static Brander and Spencer "profit
shifting tariff." Protection either in the form of a tariff or an import ban encourages the
home firm to invest in current output which reduces future costs. Protection can be valuable
because the home firm does not consider the effect of its current learning on future consumer
surplus. Tariffs can thus encourage the growth of infant industries while benefiting
consumers in the long run. In addition, the home firm can have an incentive to "dump" its
product if the potential cost savings are sufficiently valuable.
'I thank 7im Cassing, ]im Harrigan, Don Rousslang and seminar participants at the 1992
Western Economic Association International meetings for helpful comments and suggestions.
Much of the work for this paper was done while I was at the University of Pittsburgh.1. Introduction
Learning-by-Doing is significant in many high technology industries. T'hese industries
include the production of airframes, nuclear power technologies, chemical processes and
semi-conductors.' Fach of these industries can be described as being imperfectly
competitive. Despite the existence of oligopolistic industries with leaming-by-doing, almost
all of the earlier discussions of learning-by-doing and the infant industry argument have used
a perfectly competitive framework.Z Since learning-by-doing is significant in many
oligopolistic industries, the inf,~nt industry argument naturally should also be examined in
such a framework.
In their paper on learning-by-doing and mazket swcture, Dasgupta and Stiglitz(1988)
examine the infant industry azgument by considering the welfare effects of a temporary
import ban in an imperfectly competitive learning-by-doing industry. They assume that there
is a single domestic firm and that foreign production is competitive and has exhausted it's
learning potential. They show that under many circumstances, a temporary import ban is
welfare enhancing. One problem with their analysis is that in general, one would not
typically expect an industry to have a structure where home production is undertaken by a
single domestic fum while foreign production is competitive. There is no a priori reason to
believe that domestic production is concentnted among a few firms and that foreign
production is composed of many firms. On the contrary, one would ezpect that both home
and foreign production would have similar chazacteristics. A sewnd problem is that there
is no need for the home government to impose a policy as extreme as an import ban.
[ndeed, it is clear that tariffs are a better instrument for promoting domestic welfare. Not
only do tariffs discourage foreign production but they also extract rents from the foreign
producers. Furthermore, allowing the use of tariffs does not preclude the use of an import
ban - an import ban is equivalent to the imposition of a prohibitive tariff.
I extend Dasgupta and Stiglitz's analysis by considering optimal protective tariff
policy when the industry is oligopolistic. I allow the use of a tariffrather than an import ban
and foreign production is no longer assumed to be competitive. The model is a simple two-
period model of learning-by-doing where production in the first period reduces costs in the
'See Alchian (1963), Baldwin and Krugman (1988), L.eiberman (1984) and Zimmerman
(1983).
'See 13ardhan (1971), Clemhout and Wan (1970) and Succar (1987).z
second. In some cases, as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz, the home government will impose a
prohibitive tariff (import ban) to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the
other hand, very often, a pmtective tariff provides greater welfare than when an import ban
is imposed. In these cases, the first period equilibrium tariff is greater than the static
Brander and Spencer (1984) "profit shifting tariff." Furthermore, if the discounted cost
savings are sufficiently large, the home firm will dump its product, even though it is already
benefiting from a protective tariff.
2. The Model
In each period t-1,2, the home government chooses a tariff to be imposed on the
foreign firm. Each firm then simultaneously chooses its output level given the tariff.
Profits for firm H and firm F in period t are:
x" - [P(q"fq~ - c"]q" (1)
~r; - [P(q"}q~ - Tt " C~IqP (2)
H and F denote the home and foreign firms and i denotes either H or F. Firm i's period t
output is q,. T, is the period t tariff. The good is assumed to be homogeneaus with linear
inverse demands p-a-b(q"tq~. Period 1 unit costs are c;-c'. F's period 2 unit cost is
cz-c;. H's period 2 unit cost is c2-c"-dq". The foreign firm's unit cost does not change
with experience and represents an established firm which has exhausted its learning potential.
The home firm's unit cost is linear and downward sloping. In a two period model, a linear
leaming curve is a reasonable approximation of more general learning curves where the slope
of the home firm's unit cost represents its current learning potential. The smaller d is, the
closer the home firm is to exhausting its leaming potential. Assume tha[ almax,c'.
Following standard practice, I use total surplus as the measure of home welfare.
Home country welfare (W) is thus the sum of home profits (~), consumer surplus (S) and
tariff revenues (R).
W, - ~r", t S, t R, (3)
v~
where tariff revenue is R,-T,q; and net consumer surplus is S~-~p (~) d~-p (q~) q~ when
0
total output is q,.
Firms and governments have common discount factor S. The assumption of a3
common discount factor is not crucial and I discuss later the results when discount factors
aze assumed to be asymmetric.
3. The Optimal Tarift
The sub-game perfect equilibrium is solved in four stages: i) the period 2 Cournot
outputs, ii) the period 2 optimal tariff, iii) the period 1 Coumot outputs and iv) the period
1 optimal tariff. Each successive stage is solved using the solutions from the previous stages.
Computation of the equilibrium is simplified by expressing d as a scalaz multiple of b
(d -1`b).
In period 2, the outputs are the standard Coumot outputs with linear demands and
constant unit costs.
0 }f a}cPfT2s2c2
a- 2cZ t(c P t T2) if a}c PtT2~2c2





a-2(c PtT2)tc2 if atc2~2cpt2Tz
9i ' 3b and atcFtTz~2c2
F a-c ~f atc FtT2s2cz
36
(4)
Notice that since cZ depends on q", period 1 tariff policy and output affects period 2 output,
profits and welfare.
The optimal period 2 tariff can be found by maximizing
W2 - n2 4S2t~
- b(9z )
b(9it4i)2 Z9i H2t 2 ,T4
where q2 and qi are as in (4) and (5). Solving this problem yields Tz-(a-c~13. Substituting
this into (4) and (5) yields the period 2 equilibrium outputs.
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In period 1, firms maximize total discounted profits taking into account how their
choice of period 1 output affects period 2 profits.
~ - ~if~~i (~
Taking into account the period 1 optimal tariffT, (to be derived later), there are five possible
equilibrium outcomes which depend on the `value of learning' and the initial cost
configurations. These outcomes are summarized in table 1. A ' f' indicates parameters are
such that the firm in question produces posi6ve output and a`0' indicates zero output. AII
of the other possible outcomes can be eliminated by examining the inequalities which must
hold from (4') and (5'). For example, if the home firm produces in the second period but
not in the first, there are no learning effects and hence the equilibrium in each period must
be the same as the static equilibrium. If the home firm dces not produce in the first period
then it must be that 2afcP53c". But if the produces in the second period then 2afcP~ 3c"
- a contradiction.5
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I -~ f i- t
II f 0 t f
III t t ~- 0
IV f 0 f 0
V 0 f 0 f
Case II is when the home government finds it optimal to impose a prohibitive import
tariff (import ban) on the foreign firm in period 1 while allowing the foreign firm to compete
in period 2. This corresponds to Dasgupta and Stiglitz's result showing that an import ban
can enhance domestic welfaze. There aze other possibilities, however, which the'u restric[ion
of only considering the possibility of an import ban rules out. For example, it is generally
not necessary to totally restrict impon.s in period 1. In cases I and III a protective tariff
which dces not prohibit period 1 imports is optimal. It may be that as in case III, that the
protection afforded to the home firm allows it to reduce its costs by enough to drive the
foreign firm out of the market in period 2.
I first solve for the equilibrium outputs, prices and tariffs in case I and then present
the final solutions for the other cases which are solved for in a similar fashion. Firm F's
first and second order conditions are the same as in period 2 since it is assumed to have
exhausted its learning potential and its period I output has no effect on its period 2 profits.
Firm H's period 1 output affects its period 2 profits and its first and second order conditions
are as follows:
z
~ N - a-c g-bqF- 2b- 869~l Xt~~ (iOtC P-3C ~- U (g)
~H6
à2aN - -26(9-4p,12) ~ 0
(a9 ")2 9
(9)
The home firm's second order condition holds if and only if Sl`Zc914. This requires that
the discounted potential wst savings should not be too large.
Using the first order conditions, I solve for each firm's reaction function.






The home firm's reaction function is always steeper than its static counterpart and if the
foreign firm's cost advantage (c"-c`~ is not too large relative the home firm's maximum profit
margin (a-c") then the intercept is also greater (compare to when S-0).







As long as the foreign firm's cost advantage is not too large, the home firm increases
its current output in order to reduce its future costs and become more competitive in period
2(compare equation (12) to itself when there are no learning effects, ~-0). An increase in
home output necessarily forces the foreign firm to restrict its output.
In period 1, the home government chooses the tariff to maximize total discounted
welfare, taking into account how this choice affects the firms' period 1 output choices and
period 2 welfare.
W - W, f SW2 (14)
The first and second order conditions are:7
aw - 3(243.64~z,t`)(a-c~t~,l(27t64~A~[2(a-c~-(ca-c~]
aTl 3b(27-16~,iz~
- 9~xz(23a-33cFt10c~ - 3(243-267~~12t64az~4)T
- 0
6(27-16[i11~ 6(27-16~,tz)z ~
~W - - 3(243-267[i~lztó4~z~t') ~ 0
(a7'~)z 6(27-16[iA~z
It can be shown that both the home firm's second order condition and the government's
second order condition holds if and only if S~z c(267- 10 0 9)I128 ~ 1.34. This also
ensures that the denominator of (12) and ( 13) are always positive.
I solve (15) for T, to get the home government's optimal period 1 tariff.
7... - 3(243t64pzJ~')(a-c~t~J~(27t64p,1~(2atcP-3c~
9(243-267(i,lzt64(iz~l~)
3ji 7~z(23a-33cPt lOc ~
- 243-267p~1zt64pzx`
(17)
I substitute this into (12) and (13) to get period 1 output and then substitute the resulting
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~x2(187a -307cFt12Qc") ~4~x'(a -c~
- 36(243-267p~12.64~,1')
In case II, the period 1 tariff is prohibitive so period 1 foreign output is zero.
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(23)
ln case IfI, the period 2 profit shifting tariff is prohibitive and so period 0 foreign
output is zero. This results in the following period 1 tariff, home and foreign outputs
and period 2 home output:
7. - (Iit~Á4)(Q~ lf~a,(3tIj~2)([l~")-QÁ2(SU-ICFa4C")
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Finally in case V, the foreign cost advantage is too great and the home firm does not
produce in either period. Foreign output is (a-c~l3b and the tariffis (a-c~13 in both periods.
As long as both home and foreign outputs are positive in both periods, the home
government will not prohibit foreign imports. To see when this is true, I first examine (18)
and (21). It is easy to see that as long as the second order conditions are satisfied and 2(a-
c")5c"-c" then the home firm does not produce and case V is relevant. Hence the home
firm will always produce in both periods as long as the foreign firm's cost advantage is not
too large. Next, I examine the difference between the period 1 and 2 foreign outputs from
case I in order to determine the conditions under which case II is relevant and the conditions
under which case III is relevant.
F P . [2(a-c~-(c"-c~]1`(162-243~-57~~-72~1`zfó4sz~2)
~~ -~z 96(243-26751`zt64~z~')
(31)
Assuming that the home firm produces (2(a-c")~c"-c~ then for sufficiently lazge S and
positive 7`, this expression is always negative and q; ~qZ. In general, q;cq2 whenever S and
~ are large. This implies that as the foreign firm's cost increases, its period 1 output will
be driven to zero faster than it's period 2 output. Therefore, for relatively lazge S and l, and
moderately large cF, case II is relevant. Similarly, for rela[ively small S and ~ and
moderately large cP, case III is relevant. Obviously for sufficiently large cp the foreign firm
will not produce in either period and case IV pertains. These results are summarized in the
following three figures. Figure 3.a is relevant for when ~ and ~ are relatively large, figure
3.b is relevant for when ~B is large and ~ is small and figure 3.c is relevant for when ~ and
7` are both small. In these figures, the area above the diagonal is of the most interest since
one would expect that a foreign industry which has exhausted its learning potential will have
a lower cost than a domestic industry which has not exhausted its learning-potential.10
{insert figures 3.a, 3.b and 3.c here}
4. Results
First, it is of interest is examine whether or not learning-by-doing increases the
incentive to protect the domestic firm. 1'he benchmark I use is the optimal tariff from the
static model ('f'-(a-c~13).' I compare the dynamic tariffs for the cases when both firms
produce in period 1(cases I and lII). These cases are the ones of interest because in cases
II and IV the tariff is not uniquely defined and in case V the home firm dces not produce and
hence discussion of protective policy is not relevant. The difference between the dynamic
tariffs ((17) and (29)) and static tariff is:
px(2atcF-3c~(27t901t64~,1j ccue I




The numerator is always positive as long as 2atc"~3c" (this is required for positive home
production) and the denominator is positive as long as the second order conditions are
satisfied. Furthermore, since the numerator is increasing in ~ and the denominator is
decreasing in ~(when the second order conditions are satisfied), this difference is increasing
in )`.
Prnpositi~~n l: When both firnu prrxluce in perirx! I, 7;'~ T aruld~'-T)~d~ 10.
This result depends on the fact that the foreign firm has completely exhausted its potential
for learning. I discuss later how the result is affected if the foreign firm is not assumed to
have exhausted its learning.
The intuition behind this result is that even though the home firm recognizes the effect
of its output on its future profits, there is still an externality because it does not take into
'An alternative benchmark is the optimal tariff when firms have foresight and
governments behave myopically (the tariff which maximizes Wo from (14)). T'his altemadve
benchmark is strictly smaller than the tariff for the sta[ic model and hence if the static tariff
is smaller than the dynamic tariff the alternative benchmark is also smaller than the dynamic
tariff.11
account how its current decisions affect future consumer surplus. For example, if the home
firm to expands its output sufficiently, future prices are lower and hence future consumer
surplus is higher. The home firm dces not consider this when maximizing profits and
therefore, provides the domestic government with an incentive to protect the domestic firm.
tt is also of interest to consider whether or not there is an incentive for the domestic
firm to dump, even though it is benefiting fmm protective domestic policies. Dick (1991)
and Gruenspecht (1988) examine a duopoly trade model of leazning-by-doing where there is
no government intervention. They find that firms dump their product in the first period in
order to reduce their future costs and to be more competitive in the second period. This can
turn out to be true for the home firm even when it benefits from a pmtective tariff.
Again I examine the case when both firms produce in period I. I substitute the
outputs ((12) and (13) and (IS) and (19)) into the inverse demand function to get the period
1 price. I then compute the period 1 profit margin.
( (2a.cF-3c~](486-207~~-648S~2f128S21`'t192~z~')







These expressions are negative, when the foreign firm's cost advantage is not too lazge and
when S and ~ are sufficiently large yet satisfy the second order condition. This is most
easily demonstrated by considering the case when S-),-1. Hence the following proposition:
Propnsitinn 2: When both firms produce in perind 1, p, ~c" if and only if S and 1` are
su~ciently large.
The home firm prices below its unit cost if the discounted cost savings aze valuable
enough and if the foreign firm has exhausted its learning potential. Many countries define
this type of behavior as dumping. The result is striking because, even though the home
government imposes a protective tariff, the home firm still has an incentive to dump its
product when the discounted cost savings are sufficien[ly large. Dick (1991) and
Gruenspecht's (1988) dumping result occurs in a model where the home government dces
not impose a protective tariff.12
S. Concluding Remarks
This paper provides support for the infant industry azgument when the industry is
oligopolístic and when there is learning-by-doing. If the home firm's potential for learning
is relatively large compared to the foreign firm and the foreign firm's cost advantage is not
too lazge then the home government can improve welfare by imposing some type of
protective policy. The protective policy that the home government uses can be either an
import ban or a protective taziff. This pmtection result is due to the fact that the home firm
does not internalize the affect of its first period decision on future consumer surplus.
Although protecdon nlay be beneficial to the home country, under somecircumstances
joint welfare of the two countries will be reduced. In particular, if the foreign firm has a
cost advantage and the value of the home firm's potential for learning is small, joint optimal
policy would not be to encourage home production since the foreign firm is the more
efficient producer. In a general equilibrium setting where there is trade going in both
directions, agreements to ban trade restrictions may be beneficial to both parties.
On the other hand, when one of the countries is an LDC, it may be that the foreign
country would want to allow the home country to protect its infant industries in order to aid
in the LDC's development, even though total world surplus is lower. This would help home
country develope industries which can compete on the world market and would act as a
North-South welfare transfer. A pure monetary transfer may not suffice if self-sufficiency
is the eventual goal and development depends on some learning industries.
One of my assumptions is that the foreign firm has completely exhausted its learning
potential. This is not crucial to my results. For example, the much more complicated
equilibrium can be computed for the more general case where the foreign firm is still
learning (cZ -cP-dPq; and c? -c"-dxq") The equilibrium tariffs and prices will be continuous
functions of dP. Since propositions 1 and 2 are true when dP-O they also hold as long as dP
is not too large. Hence with foreign learning, the propositions can be amended with the
condition that the foreign firm should have sufficiently exhausted its learning potential.
Another assumption is that the government and firms have identical discount factors.
With asymmetric discount factors, the dynamic tariff can be smaller than the static tariff if13
the government's discoun[ factor is sufficiently small.` In this case, the home firm is more
patient than the government and from the government's point of view, the home firm
requires no fuMer incentives to increase output.
Another possible policy tool for the domestic govemment would be domestic
production subsidies. It can be argued that subsidies may be a superior tool because they
would benefit first period consumer surplus as well as encouraging expanded domestic
production. On the other hand, although tariffs decrease current consumer surplus, they also
serve the purpose of protecting the home firm as well as extracting rents from the foreign
firm. Without a detailed analysis, the conditions under which a subsidy is superior and those
under which a tariff is superior cannot be determined, however, it is clear that a superior
policy tool would be for the govemment employ both tariffs and production subsidies.
Inclusion of these analysis might be interesting but would not alter the result that some form
of protection might enhance the welfare of an individual country.
Finally, another possibility would be if the home government could initially commit
to a long-term policy. It can be shown that, in this case, the protection result is even
stronger. In case I(when both firms produce in both periods), the tariffs in both periods are
strictly greater than the static tariff. The intuition is that the promise of protection in both
periods, induces the home firm to further expand its first period output. Protection in the
second period is more effective if second period costs are lower. 1'his, however, raises the
question ofwhether or not the home govemment can credibly commit to a long-term policy.
yi'o demonstrate, consider case l. With asymmetric discount factors, the dífference in
the dynamic and static tariffs is:
T`.-7., . [2(a-c~-(cB-cF)]~(243pa-216aJt162(3s1~-72pf.1t64(p~z.L2)
9(243-27p 8~11-240pf,1Zt64(~~2,1`)
where ~3' and S` are the government and firm discount factors. This is positive as long as
~ is not too small.14
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